Events of the last several months and the following geo-political shifts in Eurasia have laid the foundations for the forming of new strategic alliances, including active re-examination of the option to create a lasting bloc of Turkic states. These trends allow Israel to improve its standing with countries of the aforementioned macro-ethnic group, the capability of reinforcing the status of local Jewish communities, broaden the horizons of the mutual relations with these moderate Muslim-majority states, as well as strengthen the Israeli opposition to the Iranian regime. Regional, as well as other, Jewish umbrella organizations can prove to be an important instrument in realizing these innovative, promising, enterprises and their implementation.

Major geo-political changes, catalyst for which was the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine, led to the forming of new, or reviving of past, political and military alliances, including – actualization of the idea of a union of states, where members of the multi-ethnic group of Turkic peoples are numerically dominating and widely represented culturally, and representatives of which are found across the extensively vast territories from China to the Balkans. In a scenario where such a union is formed, these countries, which have never, not even during the times of the Ottoman empire, formed a solid bloc naturally – the countries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan are, of course, deemed as its critical element due to their Turkic-speaking populations totalling over 80 million.

The geo-political alignment in the Turkic world

The race for control of this potential union is, in fact, already ongoing. Russia, up until recently a major powerhouse in the Caucasus and Central Asian regions, getting bogged down in Ukraine, is clearly losing its former influence and status in these regions. China, another active player in the Central Asian arena, sees the entire region simply as raw resources ready to be mined for its economy (similar to the agreement China signed with the new Afghan-Taliban government, immediately after the departure of the US forces from Afghanistan) and in accordance with Beijing’s implementation of the “One belt, One road” doctrine, as a transshipment point on the way to western markets. Besides, being in a perpetual conflict with the Turkic Uyghurs of Xinjiang province, China is extremely wary of the idea of Turkic nationalism, even more so the idea of pan-Turkism. In light of the above, China cannot be considered a fitting candidate capable of considerably influencing, not to mention leading, this process.

The Arab Muslim world, led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, treats the majority-secular and non-Arab ethnic, post-Soviet, Muslim regions as second-rate adherents of the faith, which directly includes the Turkic, among other, ethnic states. The Arab world hopes to gain the resources of the Turkic states as well as their political support, in matters such as UN votes, without offering much in return. The “consumer” attitude of Iran to these countries, especially the rich-in-oil Azerbaijan, populated by Shi’ite Muslims, as well as the scarcely populated Kazakhstan, which holds 41% of the world’s Uranium deposits, is hard to miss. Lastly, to the US and the EU, whose agenda and influence on the formation of alliances, that can have a global impact, is quite significant – the Turkic belt, for obvious reasons, is on the peripheryfromf their attention.

In the scenario where this new and, in various ways, unexpected geo-political “distancing” of global and supra-regional centers of power, the prime subject of the region, peoples of which are preoccupied primarily with searching for a national identity these days that began when the USSR collapsed, seems to be the determination of the concurrent partnership of the Turkic regimes – in Ankara, Baku and, to a lesser extent, Astana. Ankara, currently maintaining brotherly relations with Baku and on good terms with Astana, is somewhat of a leader of this trio. Failure of the “neo-Ottoman doctrine” (Ankara’s dominating influence in the regions once part of the Ottoman empire, mainly the Arab world and the Balkans, as opposed to their integration into the EU), advanced by Erdogan and Cavusoglu soon after their Justice and Development Party came to power in the early 2000s, forced Turkey to reconcile, or at the very least, decrease the tensions in relations with countries that shifted from former partners to opponents because of the implementation of the doctrine. This reconciliation allows Turkey to focus its attention on its interests in the East.

Owning less natural resources and having a poorer economy than China or the Arab Gulf states, Turkey is capable of offering something unique to its potential partners in a Turkic power bloc. That offering is the status of a major geo-political player, attained by Turkey following its military intervention in Syria, provision of military aid to Azerbaijan and several attempts to act as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine. Turkey can provide security guarantees to Central Asia and Azerbaijan, with whom Ankara has already established brotherly ties after supporting Baku during its conflict with Armenia, who was receiving aid from Russia and Iran.

Lastly, Turkey, having a population which is part of the same macro-ethnic community as the above-mentioned Turkic countries, does not need to exploit their natural resources. Rather, it seeks to create an international platform and an economic bloc that may be able to prove that the proposed objectives of collective security, unity and stability of the Turkic peoples, are something more than just a slogan.

Israeli and Jewish factor

How will everything said affect the already low-numbering Jewish populations of post-Soviet, and other, Turkic republics and their relations with the state of Israel?

During the three decades that have passed since the collapse of the USSR, Jews, despite their more than moderate demographic weight (and perhaps also for this reason), have been a prominent part of the declared doctrines of nation-building in the countries of post-Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaijan. The Jewish revival and organized Jewish communities in these republics, as Z. Levin rightly notes, besides not posing a threat to local regimes, were even considered by the authorities as valuable assets^[1]. Moreover, in stark contrast to other Muslims, the post-Soviet Muslim countries differ by their much lower level of Judeophobia. Several alarming tendencies, such as the expressions of “concern regarding the situation” in the statements of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan regarding the IDF counterterrorism operation “Guardian of the Walls” (May 2021), which provoked anti-Semitic reactions on social media from users exposed to anti-Israeli Iranian and Turkish propaganda, so far it can be considered annoying atypical exceptions to this rule.

There is no basis for the belief that the polito-diplomatic rapprochement of the Turkic states will change the situation – rather, on the contrary, as soon as the Jews and their status in these countries is perceived and accepted, if not in the first place, then, at least, in many ways in the context of the Jewish state. In the early 1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the “Muslim awakening” was one of the focal points of public life in Central Asia and the leaders of the newly founded republics had to develop a new Muslim agenda to live by. However, disappointment with the islamic Ummah as a whole, and with the version of pan-Turkism preached by Turkey in those times, as R. Sattarov notes, came almost instantaneously. “Paradoxically, the most attractive partner in the Middle East for Central Asia turned out to be Israel, resulting in a major shift where the region turned out to be the most pro-Israeli out of the whole Islamic world”^[2].

The current redistribution of the balance of power in Eurasia unlocks a great many opportunities and possibilities for Israel in various spheres. There are several reasons for this, one is that although the idea of building a new opportunity for “equal relations” between the Turkic states was put forward by Turkish President Erdogan, the mediator in the implementation of the process will be a leader with great understanding of the Soviet mentality, which would allow him to negotiate on equal standing with the Central Asian Turkic governments. The perfect candidate is none other than Ilham Aliyev. That is – the President of Azerbaijan, a country which is a strong strategic partner of the Jewish state. The 30-year-long alliance of Baku and Jerusalem has proven to be mutually beneficial. Israel receives energy resources and intelligence on Iran while Azerbaijan is the recipient of Israeli military technologies.

In fact, it was thanks to Aliyev that Turkey took steps towards repairing and resuming diplomatic relations with Israel, which were practically frozen in 2011. The thawing of relations and the ensuing return of ambassadors in August 2022 marked the beginning of a new chapter in Israeli-Turkish relations, as did the meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid and Turkish President Erdogan outside the UN General Assembly in September 2022, as well as the visit of Israeli Defence Minister Gantz to Turkey in October 2022. Seems to be that developing relations with the Central Asian Turkic republics wouldn’t be a much harder task for Azerbaijan than reconciling Israel and Turkey. Moreover, these relations already have accumulated potential. This huge market will welcome Israeli high-tech with open arms to develop its industry and economy.

Best not forget that a Turkic bloc would be a major threat to Iran, creating an unbroken security belt along all the northern borders of the country. Consolidation of Turkic forces in Eurasia remains a top priority for Azerbaijan, which, like Israel, is an adversary of Iran and has been openly threatened by Tehran with a military strike, as evidenced by a series of large-scale military exercises and incitement of unrest among Azerbaijan’s minorities. (Thus, in early November 2022, a group of Iranian agents was captured by the Azerbaijani secret service. One of the agents was involved in the attempted murder of Israeli businessmen in Cyprus in 2021). By joining forces with the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, the Turkic confederation would be able to completely block Iran from all sides and limit the destructive influence of the Ayatollah regime in the Middle East region, forming a united front against Iranian aggression.

The Turkic bloc covers the northwest through the northeast of Iran while the Gulf states cover the southwest. Lest we forget that at the back of all those opposing Iran stands Israel, which can and is currently supplying many of Tehran’s adversaries with advanced military technologies. Besides, most of northern Iran is populated by Azerbaijanis – over 20 million Turkic people, who are the major power in the current protests and seek independence in the territory called Southern Azerbaijan. The creation of a Turkic bloc may turn their desire into a reality, thus dealing a devastating blow to Iran’s regime.

It is difficult to doubt whether Israel will remain a sought-after component of this geo-political map. A status, which, in turn, will allow Israel to improve relations with the countries of the Turkic bloc under construction, improve the situation of local Jewish communities, expand the horizons of relations with moderate Muslim states, and help Israel in the confrontation with Iran. Regional and other umbrella Jewish organizations can be an important tool in realizing and developing these new promising prospects.

^[1] Зеев Левин, «Еврейское образование и общинная жизнь евреев Центральной Азии в контексте отношений с властями стран региона». Евреи Европы и Азии: состояние, наследие и перспективы». Т. 3 (2020–2021/5781).  Иерусалим и Герцелия: Институт Евро-Азиатских Еврейских Исследований и Институт Иудаики Еврейского Университета в Иерусалиме, 2021

^[2] Рафаэль Саттаров, «Центральная Азия и ее евреи между Израилем и исламской уммой», Euro-Asian Jewish(EAJ) Policy Papers, No 3 (Dec 3, 2018), https://institute.eajc.org/eajpp-3/